Volume 19, Issue 67 (Autumn 2014 2014)
__Judicial Law Views __2012__, 19(__59__): __224102 |
Back to browse issues page
Download citation:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:
BibTeX | RIS | EndNote | Medlars | ProCite | Reference Manager | RefWorks
Send citation to:
Hoseini S M, Saberi Tavallaei A. On a Compromised Justification of Punishment. دیدگاههای حقوقی 2014; 19 (67) :81-102
URL: http://jlviews2.ujsas.ac.ir/article-1-189-en.html
URL: http://jlviews2.ujsas.ac.ir/article-1-189-en.html
1- Tehran University
2- University of Tehran
2- University of Tehran
Abstract: (8494 Views)
There has been a longstanding battleground on the justification of Punishment with two persistent worriers Retributivism and Utilitarianism. The endless controversies of philosophers illustrate that both of theories have met the fatal criticisms and neither can provide a proper answer to the question of “Why Punish?”. As a solution, some tried to reconstruct their favorite theory, while some other proposed a compromised answer. Amongst the compromised models, the theory suggested by analytic philosophers seems the most coherent one, which relies upon the “conceptual analysis”. It emphasizes on the separation of different questions and provides rooms for two answers utility and retribution. I’ll focus and argue against that compromised model as suggested by H.L.Hart and John Rawls.
Keywords: Justification of Punishment, Utilitarianism, Retributivism, Compromised Theory, Analytic Philosophy
Type of Study: Research |
Subject:
Pivate Law
Received: 2013/09/15 | Revised: 2019/02/06 | Accepted: 2015/04/18 | Published: 2015/04/26 | ePublished: 2015/04/26
Received: 2013/09/15 | Revised: 2019/02/06 | Accepted: 2015/04/18 | Published: 2015/04/26 | ePublished: 2015/04/26
| Rights and permissions | |
 |
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. |
